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HOBBS ACT MAY PROHIBIT A CONSPIRACY BY CANDIDATES
FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976)
In United States v. Meyers,' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit expanded the scope of the Hobbs ActO to include a conspiracy
by candidates for office to extort money under color of official right.
While nonincumbent candidates for office, defendants allegedly
agreed, in return for monetary consideration, that after their election
they would award contracts to the payors.8 Defendants were subse-
quently elected, assumed office, and were indicted for conspiracy "to
affect commerce by obtaining property of another, with his consent, in-
duced under color of official right,"' 4 in violation of the Hobbs Act.
The district court dismissed the indictment, concluding that a candidate
for public office cannot obtain property under color of official right."
The court of appeals reversed, remanded with directions to reinstate
the indictment, and held: It is a violation of the Hobbs Act for a non-
incumbent candidate to conspire to affect commerce by extortion in-
duced under color of official right when the conspiracy begins before
the election but continues after the candidate has obtained public of-
fice, if the payor could have reasonably believed that the defendant
would be elected and the defendant exploited that belief.'
Congress enacted the Hobbs Act 7 "to prevent interference with in-
terstate commerce by robbery or extortion. ' 's To achieve this objective,
1. 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
3. United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976).
4. Id. at 1035.
5. United States v. Meyers, 395 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (E.D. MI1. 1975), rev'd, 529
F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976). The district court reasoned
that defendants did not have the official privileges and duties usually considered requi-
site elements of extortion and thus could not be considered public officials as required
for common law and some statutory extortion.
The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court's formulation of the issue in terms of
the substantive offense of extortion and restated the issue as one of conspiracy.
6. United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 894 (1976).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
8. H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945), reprinted in [1946] U.S.
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the Act prohibits obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce by rob-
bery or extortion, or attempting or conspiring to do so.9 Because the
legislative history and language of the Hobbs Act manifest an intent
by Congress to utilize all its power under the commerce clause "to pun-
ish interference with interstate commerce,"'10 courts have broadly inter-
preted the Act's prohibitions."
The Act incorporates the common law meaning of extortion'2 and
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1360. See also Note, Extortion 'Under Color of Official
Right': Federal Prosecution of Official Corruption Under the Hobbs Act, 5 Loy. Cm.
L.J. 513 (1974).
9. The text of subsection (a) reads:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or ex-
tortion or attempts or conspires to do so, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Subsection (b) (2) provides: "The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
10. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
11. E.g., the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975), held that the interference with commerce need only
be potential: "[A] realistic probability that an extortionate transaction will have some
effect on interstate commerce" satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 60. In
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972), the Third Circuit determined that the "under color of official right" language
of subsection (b) (2) of the Act is in the disjunctive; thus, a public official may violate
the Act by using either force, violence, fear or the color of office to obtain property
from another. Accord, United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 645 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975). In addition, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have
found that merely creating a fear of economic harm will suffice to sustain a conviction
of a private individual under the Act. United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 996 (7th
Cir. 1974); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 915 (1955). See also United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954); Note, supra note 8; 28 VAND. L. REV. 1348
(1975).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 645 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 994 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972); Brief for Appellant at 7 n.5, United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
Common law extortion is the corrupt taking of an unlawful payment by an official
under color of office. R. PERmKNs, CmR NAL LAw 367 (2d ed. 1969). See also 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, CoN£n E.ruRas *141 (Extortion is "an abuse of public justice, which con-
sists in any officer's unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from any man, any money
or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due.").
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defines it as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
or under color of official right."' 3  Thus, extortion under the Hobbs
Act may be committed by a private person or a public official using
force, violence, or fear, or by an official acting "under color of official
right."' 4 When an official is charged with a Hobbs Act violation under
the latter prohibition, the crucial determination is whether the official
acted "under color of official right."'' 5
There is little interpretation of "under color of official right" as
used in the Hobbs Act.' 6 Although at common law extortion could
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1970).
14. See, e.g., cases cited note 12 supra.
15. See, e.g., cases cited note 12 supra. For a discussion of the requirement at
common law, see United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969); cases cited note
12 supra; Kirby v. State, 57 N.J.L. 320, 321, 31 A. 213, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1894); R.
PERINs, supra note 12, at 369.
16. See generally Note, supra note 8.
Although the interpretation of "under color of official right" is scant, a consideration
of an analogous statute may shed some light on what Congress intended by the lan-
guage in the statute under consideration. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 103(b), 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains,
or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), held that officials
or "[private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action,"
may commit the substantive offense and affirmed that private persons conspiring
with public officials may commit conspiracy to violate the section. Id. at 794. In
United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967), the Court upheld a conviction of private persons who conspired with police of-
ficers even though the police were acquitted and defendants as private citizens could not
have committed the substantive offense without the aid of state officials.
One must use caution in applying interpretations of language in one statute to a dif-
ferent statute. However, the position that a private person unable to commit the sub-
stantive offense of extortion "under color of official right" may, in some instances, be
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense is bolstered by these interpretations of
deprivation of civil rights "under color of law." They suggest that actions "under color
of law" are not rigidly restricted to actions of de jure public officials. The aura of offi-
cialdom is expansive enough to engulf those who acquire officiality by association. In
the instant case, it may be argued that a candidate for elective office acquires officiality
by proximity to the office itself.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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only be committed by a public official, 7 at least one case has held that
the official need not hold legal title to the office to act "under color
of official right."Is The Third Circuit adopted this position in United
States v. Mazzei,19 a Hobbs Act prosecution, holding that the office
used to obtain the payments need not confer de jure power on the of-
ficial to perform the promised act; it was sufficient that the victim had
a reasonable belief in the official's de facto power to perform.20 In
United States v. Braasch,2' the Seventh Circuit held that "the use of
office to obtain payments is the crux of the statutory requirement" of
extortion "under color of official right"22 and that it may encompass
classic bribery. 3
The Hobbs Act explicitly prohibits conspiring to interfere with com-
merce by extortion as well as the substantive offense. 4  Because the
statute does not define conspiracy, courts usually apply the common law
definition:23 "a combination for an unlawful purpose."26  This defini-
17. See note 15 supra.
18. Commonwealth v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. 554, 25 A. 610 (1893). A de jure official
or one who has de jure power has legal or statutory title and authorization to exercise
the powers of the office; a de facto official is one who does in fact exercise the powers
of an office but does not have legal title to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei,
521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denicd, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507
F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974); Kirby v. State, 57 N.J.L 320, 31 A. 213 (Sup. Ct. 1894);
R. PEamNs, supra note 12, at 369; 62 VA. L REv. 439, 441 & n.10 (1976).
19. 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
20. Id. (although de lure power to approve leases belonged to an executive agency,
Mazzei, a state senator who procured certain state leases for the victim in exchange for
a kickback, was convicted of violating the Hobbs Act); accord, United States v. Price,
507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Emalfarb, 484 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973). See also United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (Commissioner of Public Works who
demanded political contributions to local Republican committee from engineering firm
under contract to provide services to town convicted of extortion "under color of official
right").
21. 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
22. Id.
23. Id. See also United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd
in pertinent part, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975)
(payments to alderman to cause him to refrain from opposing zoning law changes con-
stitutes extortion "under color of official right"); Stem, Prosecutions of Local Political
Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and
Extortion, 3 SmroN HALL L Rav. 1 (1971). But see United States v. Addonizio, 451
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); United States v. Kubacki,
237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).
25. See Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1956); Hite v. United
States, 168 F.2d 973, 974 (10th Cir. 1948); R. Pamaxns, supra note 12, at 26.
26. R. PmtuNs, supra note 12, at 614; cf. 1 WHARTON'S CRnM NAL LAw AND PRo-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/5
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tion focuses on the intent or purpose of the defendants.2 7 Under the
Act, therefore, a conspiracy exists when an agreement with an unlawful
purpose is entered into and an overt act to accomplish that goal is per-
formed.2 The conspiracy generally endures until its goal is reached,20
the actual duration depending upon the scope of the agreement.80 In
addition, in cases brought pursuant to statutes prohibiting the obstruc-
tion of justice and loan sharking, courts have held that a conspiracy
whose purpose was noncriminal at its inception, but which became
criminal during the life of the agreement, violated the statutes.8 '
cEDauR § 82 (R. Anderson ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON] ("Any combina-
tion of two or more persons constitutes a criminal conspiracy when directed to the ac-
complishment either of an illegal object, or of a lawful object by illegal means.").
27. See, e.g., State v. Moretti, 52 NJ. 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952 (1968); 15 WAsm. & LEE L. Rav. 122 (1958). See generaliy W. LAFAvn & A.
ScoTr, HANRoOR ON Cmi.NAL LAw 464-66 (1972); R. PERKs, supra note 12, at 629;
WHARTON, supra note 26, § 85; Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HAv. L. Rv. 920 (1959).
28. E.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 400 (2d Cir,),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966).
Although the crime of conspiracy is committed when these two elements are satisfied,
the conspiracy may continue after it has reached the threshold of criminality, See, e.g.,
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601
(1910); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020
(1974); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972); United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
928 (1966); text accompanying notes 29-31 infra. It may continue because conspiracy
is a combination of the parties to effect the result agreed upon and not simply a meeting
of the minds. See, e.g., R. PERmNs, supra note 12, at 614-15; WHARTON, supra note
26; § 83; Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 27.
29. E.g., United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1026 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 928 (1966); United States v. Strycker, 182 F. Supp. 677, 679 (E.D. Wis.
1960).
30. United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1039 (1972); United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 928 (1966). See also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (sub-
sidiary agreement to conceal may extend the life of the conspiracy beyond the commis-
sion of the substantive offense, but only if there is direct evidence that a coverup was
expressly agreed to).
'31. See United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 1129, 1133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1076 (1972) (conviction for conspiracy to collect a loan by extortion in violation
of Federal Loan Sharking Statute upheld although agreement and threats were made be-
fore effective date of statute when payments were collected after effective date); United
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Conspiracy, which focuses upon the defendant's intent or purpose,
is a crime although its object is never reached or is impossible to at-
tain."-' Therefore, most courts do not permit defendants to raise the
defense of impossibility of committing the substantive crime in re-
sponse to a conspiracy charge.33  Some commentators and courts, how-
ever, accept the impossibility defense when it negates the intent neces-
sary to commit the crime.3 4
States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 678 (1942) (convic-
tion for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of justice permissible although, no
court proceedings were pending at the time the conspiracy was formed when proceed-
ings were begun subsequently). See also United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148 (1952).
United States v. Meyers is a case of first impression under the Hobbs Act.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1915) (conspiracy
to conceal assets of estate in bankruptcy from trustee punishable although limitations
period had run for a substantive violation of the Bankruptcy Act); Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425, 446-47 (1908) (indictment charging conspiracy to commit sub-
ornation of perjury valid although attempt to procure another to commit perjury may
not be punishable under the statute); United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (acquittal on substantive charge of pos-
session with attempt to use and sell forged and counterfeited postage stamps does not bar
conviction for conspiracy to do the same); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974) (conviction for bribery sustainable
even though object was not attainable because the government was monitoring the entire
scheme through an undercover policeman); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530, 540
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (conviction for conspiracy to extort
money in violation of the Hobbs Act sustainable although no money was paid and FBI
intervention rendered accomplishment of the extortion impossible); Beddow v. United
States, 70 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1934) (conspiracy conviction sustainable although
Treasury Bonds were not witnessed by authorized person and therefore transfer would
not be recognized by Treasury Department); United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278,
32 C.M.R. 278 (1962) (defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit rape although the
woman was dead); State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952 (1968) (woman was not pregnant but conspiracy to commit unlawful abortion sus-
tained). See generally Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 27.
33. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scotr, supra note 27, at 475. See generally Annot.,
37 A.L.R.3d 375 (1971).
34. The majority rule is that impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy. See note
33 supra and accompanying text. Some courts, however, have applied the law of impos-
sibility developed in attempt cases to conspiracy cases. See, e.g., Ventimiglia v. United
States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957) (no conviction for conspiracy to violate statute
forbidding an employer to pay any representative of his employees when the payee did
not represent defendant's employees and no one thought he did; the substantive crime
was inherently impossible of consummation); O'Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966
(8th Cir. 1941) (no conviction for conspiracy to remove goods from interstate com-
merce when the goods had ceased to be in interstate commerce); Woo Wai v. United
States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (conviction for conspiracy to unlawfully import
women not sustainable when informed law enforcement authorities were planning to re-
turn the women as soon as they crossed the border); United States v. Thomas, 13
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/5
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In United States v. Meyers, 5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that a candidate for public office, who was subsequently
elected, could conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under
color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act.8 6 Noting initially
that the charge against defendants was conspiracy, 7 the court rejected
the defendants' contention that only an extortion conspiracy entered
into by a public official could violate the Hobbs Act.88 Applying tra-
ditional rules of statutory construction, the court concluded that "under
C.M.A. 278, 32 C.M.R. 278 (1962) (victim was dead but conviction for conspiracy to
rape sustained); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 474-76; Annot., supra note 33,
and cases cited therein.
Although the doctrine of impossibility in attempt cases is confused and often contra-
dictory, frequently there is an acknowledged distinction between factual and legal impos-
sibility. Thus, if the result intended by a defendant is criminal, but due to some fact
or circumstance unknown to the defendant the desired result is unattainable, a factual
impossibility exists but does not constitute a defense. If, however, what is intended by
defendant is not a crime, notwithstanding defendant's belief as to the criminality of the
intended result, there is a valid defense of legal impossibility to an attempt charge. See,
e.g., United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 32 C.M.R. 278 (1962) and cases cited
therein; State v. Moretti, 52 N.L 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968);
W. IAFAv & A. SCOTr, supra note 27, at 438-46; R. PERINS, supra note 12, at 566-72;
Annot., supra note 33, and cases cited therein.
Wholesale application of the law of impossibility in attempt cases to conspiracy cases
has been criticized by commentators and courts because the essence of conspiracy relates
to intent whereas attempt focuses on acts leading up to the commission of a substantive
crime. See State v. Moretti, 52 N.. 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952
(1968) (inappropriate to graft the standards for impossibility in attempt cases onto con-
spiracy cases because the two crimes are of a different nature).
It seems that such an evaluation could not be sustained, however, because, as
discussed above, a conspiracy charge focuses primarily on the intent of the
defendants, while in an attempt case the primary inquiry centers on the de-
fendants' conduct tending toward the commission of the substantive crime.
The crime of conspiracy is complete once the conspirators, having formed the
intent to commit a crime, take any step in preparation; mere preparation, how-
ever, is an inadequate basis for an attempt conviction regardless of the intent.
[citation omitted] Thus, the impossibility that the defendants' conduct will
result in the consummation of the contemplated crime is not as pertinent in a
conspiracy case as it might be in an attempt prosecution.
Id. at 187, 244 A.2d at 502 (emphasis original). See also United States v. Thomas,
13 C.M.A. 278, 301, 32 C.M.R. 278, 301 (1962) (Ferguson, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); W. IAFAvB & A. ScoTt, supra note 27, at 476; 15 WASH. & Lns
L R v. 122 (1958); Annot., supra note 33. Such commentators feel that the doctrine
of impossbility should constitute a defense in conspiracy cases only when it negates the
intent to commit a crime. E.g., 15 WAsr. & LEa L. REv. 122 (1958). See also W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 476.
35. 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
36. Id. at 1036.
37. Id. at 1035; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
38. Id. at 1036.
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color of official right" modified "obtaining property of another" rather
than "conspiracy."39 Thus, only the obtaining of property, not the con-
spiracy, need be effected under color of official right to constitute a
Hobbs Act violation.
The court found the crucial consideration to be that a conspiracy
endures until its goal is reached.4" The goal of the Meyers conspiracy
was the suspension of defendants' independent judgment in awarding
contracts after they took office." Although defendants entered into
the agreement as candidates who had no power to award contracts, the
conspiracy continued after they took office and the unlawful goal was
accomplished. This constituted a conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs
Act.42
The court rejected the defendants' implicit defense of impossibility,
noting that the defense relates to whether defendants are capable of
committing the substantive crime; therefore, courts rarely allow an im-
possibility defense to a conspiracy charge.43 Because conspiracy re-
lates to the defendant's intent, the court found the more relevant in-
quiry to be whether the other parties to the conspiracy could have rea-
sonably believed that the defendants would be elected to office and
thus attain the power to accomplish the agreement's unlawful pur-
pose.44 Relying on the United States v. Mazzei45 holding that a de-
fendant having no de jure power to effect the conspiracy's goal violates
the Hobbs Act if the victim reasonably believed the defendant had the
de facto power to carry out the agreement and the defendant exploited
that reasonable belief, the Meyers court concluded that the defendants
simply exploited their victims' reasonable belief before they were
elected rather than after.40  "It is no less a crime under the Hobbs
Act," the court concluded, "to sell one's public trust before, rather than
after, one is installed in public office.
47
The Meyers decision is in accord with the law of conspiracy. The
defendants entered into an agreement with an unlawful purpose-the
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1037.
44. Id.
45. 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
46. 529 F.2d at 1038.
47. Id.
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preferential awarding of public contracts to specific persons-and per-
formed the overt act of accepting a money payment in furtherance of
that goal.48  Although the conspiracy entered into by defendants as
candidates was not criminal at its inception, 49 it became criminal when
defendants retained the money subsequent to their election.50 De-
fendants were, therefore, correctly indicted for conspiracy to violate
the Hobbs Act.
In addition, the result in Meyers gives effect to the will of Congress.
The Hobbs Act was enacted to combat interference with interstate com-
merce5' and corrupt use of official power insofar as such corruption af-
fects commerce. Courts have given effect to congressional intent that
the Act's "affecting commerce" requirement be read broadly.Y Thus,
the Meyers court did not even consider the jurisdictional question. It
was uncontested that a pre-election agreement to award contracts to
specific parties that continues into the post-election period prohibits
competitive bidding in the marketplace and therefore affects com-
merce.53 Furthermore, a contrary holding would have substantially
limited the statute's effectiveness in combatting political corruption.
The court would not, therefore, presume that Congress intended that
the Act be avoided by so simple a device as a pre-election agreement.
Although the Meyers result is desirable in view of the facts pre-
sented, the court fails to state clearly whether its holding also encom-
passes losing candidates and whether it is limited to viable candidates
for public office. Indeed, the court's oddly bifurcated opinion lends
itself to three possible interpretations: First, any subsequently elected
candidate for public office who accepts money and agrees to carry out
an unlawful purpose once in office, is guilty of conspiracy to extort
"under color of official right" in violation of the Hobbs Act. Secondly,
48. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 19-23 supra and
accompanying text.
50. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Brief for Appellee and Brief for Appellant. The jurisdictional question was
probably not raised because the parties recognized that a minimal interstate conection
satisfies the requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 *F.2d 53 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v. Auguello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968); Hulahan v. United States, 214 P.2d 441
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954); 28 VAmD. L. Rv. 1348 (1975).
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any candidate for public office, even if not subsequently elected, who
enters into such a pre-election agreement with another party violates
the Hobbs Act if that other party reasonably believed that the candidate
would be elected and the candidate exploited that belief. Thirdly, any
subsequently elected candidate who enters into such an agreement vio-
lates the Act if the other party reasonably believed that the candidate
would be elected and the candidate exploited that belief.
Although any of these alternative holdings is arguably correct, the
third interpretation makes an otherwise bifurcated opinion whole and
establishes a rational extension of the Hobbs Act. The lengthy discus-
sion of impossibility and reasonable belief54 would be mere dictum if
the first alternative were the court's intended holding.5 5 The second
possible holding, although consistent with the reasonable belief discus-
sion,5 is inconsistent with the court's initial conclusion that a continuing
extortion conspiracy "under color of official right" constitutes a viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act.57 The third interpretation, on the other hand,
results in a logical and internally consistent opinion. Thus, a subse-
quently elected candidate violates the Hobbs Act if the candidate agrees,
in return for a money payment, to perform unlawful acts once elected.
The defense of impossibility is available to a subsequently elected candi-
date only if the other party to the agreement unreasonably believed the
defendant would prevail. 8
If it is reasonable to believe that defendants will be elected, their
intent to perform the act prohibited by the statute can be inferred.59
54. United States v. Meyers, 521 F.2d at 1036-37.
55. The fact that the conspiracy continued until the candidate became a public of-
ficial would suffice to make out a violation of the Hobbs Act, thereby rendering any
discussion of reasonable belief and impossibility unnecessary. See notes 40-42 supra
and accompanying text.
56. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
58. The defense would be appropriate here because if the other party's belief were
unreasonable, it can be argued that the requisite intent was lacking. See notes 33-34
supra and accompanying text.
59. Cf. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943) (drug wholesaler
convicted of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws on inference of intent based on un-
usually large quantity of drugs supplied); People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59
Cal. Rptr. 628 (Ct. App. 1967) (inference of intent of supplier of goods and services
to participate in criminal conspiracy permissible in certain circumstances). But ef.
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (supplier's knowledge that customer
would use goods for illicit purpose not sufficient to infer that supplier knew of conspir-
acy). See generally United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975); W. LAFAvE & A.
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If defendants are not in a viable position to be elected, the criminal
intent is more difficult to discern. Under these circumstances, defend-
ants might successfully argue that no agreement was made that anyone
believed would be performed. Unfortunately, the court left unan-
swered the critical question of how to determine viability and reason-
able belief. When confronted with this problem, therefore, courts
should consider the political climate in which the agreement was made
and its proximity to the election in determining whether a candidate
was sufficiently viable to render the other party's belief reasonable.
The Meyers court correctly held that federal prosecution of candi-
dates who extort contributions in return for promises of official action
is within the scope of the Hobbs Act. This result conforms to the law
of conspiracy and gives effect to the will of Congress. The court's rea-
soning, however, is unclear and its precedential value is consequently
limited. In addition, Meyers may have the undesirable consequence
of subjecting public officials who accept bona fide campaign contribu-
tions to harrassment when their official acts appear to benefit the con-
tributors. Courts should carefully distinguish, on a case-by-case basis,
the criminal campaign contribution "with strings" from the beneficent
contribution indicating the donor's general approval of the candidate's
policies.
Scowr, supra note 27, at 464-68; Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra
note 27.
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